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AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Indonesia Drifts Toward Chaos

by William Henderson

Indonesia's domestic situation has deteriorated rapidly in recent months, and for the first time full-scale civil war seems likely.

The underlying issue is regional autonomy. Two-thirds of Indonesia's 85 million people live on the crowded island of Java, where the national capital, Jakarta, is located. Inevitably, Javanese have tended to dominate the highly centralized machinery of government. Moreover, Jakarta has consistently favored Javanese welfare at the expense of the outer regions. From the economic point of view Java is a deficit area, while most other parts of Indonesia are surplus areas. In the past this surplus was drained off to support Java. Little or nothing has been done by the central government to build up the country, and the outer regions were given neither funds nor authority to act for themselves.

In domestic politics no single party has won a dominant position. Cabinets have necessarily depended on coalition support in parliament. Their consequent weakness in considerable measure accounts for the failure of the government to come to grips with hard political and economic problems.

During recent years the center of political

gravity has rested on the Nationalist party (PNI), which has always been closely identified with President Sukarno. More and more the PNI has received and accepted backing from the Communist party (PKI). Both parties are in the main based on Java. The Muslim Masjumi, on the other hand, derives much of its support and leadership from the outer regions. While often participating in cabinets with the PNI, the Masjumi has bitterly opposed the Communists. In turn it was the chief target of Communist attack in Indonesia's first national elections held in 1955. The fourth major party, the Nahdatul Ulama, is an orthodox Muslim grouping that has vacillated between the PNI and Masjumi.

These divisions have been paralleled to some extent in the army, which has been raised largely on a regional basis. Most army units on Java are PNI-oriented and, on lower officer and troop levels, extensively infiltrated by the Communists. In off-Java territories army formations have been identified, if at all, with more moderate parties and staffed by officers of local ethnic origin.

The second cabinet of Nationalist leader Ali Sastroamidjojo, which took office in March

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1956, was a disaster. Torn by scandal and riddled with corruption, it proved incapable of effective action in any sphere. That fall President Sukarno, after a trip abroad which included visits to several Communist countries, began to denounce Indonesia's Western-style democracy as a failure and to demand the "burial" of all political parties. He called instead for a system of "guided democracy." In December the highly respected Mohammed Hatta, idol of the outer regions, resigned from the vice-presidency in disgust.

Later that month military commanders in Central and North Sumatra publicly broke with Jakarta. Their action touched off a wave of similar defiance throughout the archipelago. In the next few months bloodless coups were staged in South Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. The rebels' principal objective was autonomy rather than independence, however, and the rebel leaders uniformly avowed their continued loyalty to the Republic. More than anything else, their action was designed to influence Jakarta toward compromise on regional grievances.

Sukarno's "Conception"

In face of growing stagnation at the center and separatism in the outer regions, Sukarno gave concrete shape to his program for resolving the country's dilemmas. His specific proposals, formally announced on February 21, 1957, typically avoided the heart of things in favor of a "political" solution that solved nothing. The essence of Sukarno's "con-

ception" was an all-party cabinet including the Communists and a widely representative national council to advise the government.

Sukarno's program set in motion a steady polarization of political forces in Indonesia. His much-heralded "conception" won endorsement from the Communists and the backing of the PNI, but provoked a storm of opposition from the Masjumi, which had withdrawn from the Ali cabinet in January, and other groupings. In the outer regions the struggle for autonomy took on an increasingly anti-Communist coloration.

Ali resigned in March and was replaced the following month by the "presidential" cabinet of Djuanda. Sukarno did not insist on overt Communist participation, although three places were filled by fellow travelers and the cabinet had the support of the PKI. When the national council was set up in June, it contained about a dozen avowed Communists and fellow travelers. That summer the Communists made striking new gains in local elections on Java.

On February 10, 1958 the Central Sumatran dissidents, widely recognized as leaders of the autonomy movement, issued an ultimatum calling for Djuanda's resignation and the end of "guided democracy." They demanded also that Sukarno withdraw to his position of constitutional president and that Hatta and the sultan of Jogjakarta, a revolutionary hero and former minister of defense, be given the task of forming a new cabinet free of pro-Communist influence. When Jakarta rejected this ulti-

matum, the rebels, five days later, proclaimed a provisional government at Padang, Central Sumatra.

The central government has reacted violently. For the first time military measures have been taken against the rebels. How is this generally unexpected step to be explained? It is likely that government leaders in Jakarta, realizing that a protracted stalemate could have disastrous economic consequences and that any compromise acceptable to Padang inevitably meant a wholesale house cleaning, urged extreme action in the hope of bringing the dissidents to heel and thus salvaging their own position. The Communists, who would have preferred not to start anything now in anticipation of the 1959 parliamentary elections, probably had no alternative but to urge the same course. In any case, they stood to profit from the growing turmoil.

The possibility of a peaceful solution should not be ruled out. Although their influence grows daily, the Communists have not won a dominant voice in Jakarta. Sukarno and his colleagues may yet be persuaded to come to terms with the dissidents. Former Vice President Hatta is still in the capital and has not openly sided with Padang. The sultan of Jogjakarta has also maintained public neutrality. But the longer a settlement is delayed, the more difficult it becomes. Even in Indonesia, time eventually runs out.

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U.S. Trade Policy in Danger

Every time the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, first adopted in June 1934, comes up for renewal there is the cry, "This is it! This time the program is in real danger!"

And this time there are indeed mounting signs that the program is in greater danger than ever before. It was all the Administration could do to find one Republican among the ten on the House Ways and Means Committee to sponsor its bill for renewal. All signs point to a new high—or low—in overt and covert lobbying.

The paradox is that at a time when the need for extension of the reciprocal trade act was never greater, opposition to extension has also never been greater. And the opposition has picked up new converts of late.

The current recession is aiding the protectionists. The over-all world trade picture cuts no ice with the millions of unemployed who say, "Imports are keeping us idle; they are taking work away from us by taking sales away from the companies we work for." You may try and tell them that because the United States sells \$19 billion in goods and services abroad each year and buys only \$13 billion, Uncle Sam has a bigger stake in selling than in buying. Or you may try and tell them that if the United States raises tariffs, our friends abroad will do likewise, and then what will happen to our foreign markets? The unemployed want a living, not a lecture; they want timecards, not trade figures.

The protectionists are also picking up support in the traditionally "free trade" South. As the South becomes industrialized, it becomes more protectionist. Its growing textile indus-

try is determined to shut out the mounting competition from Japanese mills. The independent oil producers in the Southwest are agitating for protection against oil imports.

What President Wants

The consensus in Washington is that the President will be considered lucky if he gets even a year's lease without some crippling amendments.

What the President has asked for is a five-year extension of the law; authority to reduce most tariffs 5 percent each year over the next five years; and changes in the "escape clause" which would benefit protectionists. This last provision was thrown in to win their support. It is already clear this is not going to come anywhere near satisfying them.

The five-year extension seems definitely out in spite of the fact that the President has advanced a most logical and persuasive argument: he contends that it is going to take four or five years at best to work out our tariff rates with Europe's new six-nation Economic Community.

Regardless of whether the President wins a five-year extension of the act, he is not going to be given the right to reduce tariffs by another 25 percent. He may get some room to negotiate, but 25 percent is an awful lot to the protectionists, who have already seen recurring Administrations cut tariffs by some 50 percent.

Under the "escape clause" domestic businesses may appeal for tariff protection when they feel they have suffered from imports. The United States Tariff Commission then evaluates these appeals and makes recommendations on tariff changes to the President, who takes final action. Ex-

perience has shown that the Tariff Commission favors the complaining industries and businesses, generally supporting their requests for protection. The President, for his part, tends to overrule the commission, holding that the industries have not been unduly hurt by imports. The protectionists this year, therefore, are pressing for an amendment to the act that would virtually wipe out the Presidential veto on "escape clause" cases and give the Tariff Commission all but complete power to invoke the clause to raise tariffs.

The government's recent ruling against the watch-making industry, which has sought increased duties on foreign watches, aroused the protectionists on two points: first, it reversed a previous ruling that the industry was essential to national security and therefore in need of special protection; second, it rejected the industry's bid for higher import duties on foreign watches. It thus made the protectionists determined not only to exclude the White House and its offices from these decisions, but to make the Tariff Commission supreme.

A new argument for the President's reciprocal trade program is being advanced with considerable effectiveness. It relates to the Soviet bloc's beefed-up drive for aid and trade throughout Asia and Africa. This is the worst of all times, so it is argued, to either trim foreign aid or restrict foreign trade.

If kingdoms have been lost for want of a horse-shoe nail, a civilization, a way of life, it is said here, could well be lost for want of an intelligent United States trade policy.

NEAL STANFORD



Can Anyone's *Status Quo* Be Preserved?

With the rejection by the United States on March 6 of Soviet proposals for a preliminary meeting of foreign ministers, to prepare a summit conference, the prospect for a top-level discussion between the West and the U.S.S.R. appeared to have dimmed. Yet reports from Britain and France indicated that our two principal Western allies were, as British cartoonist Sidney Low put it, packing their bags for a summit conference. And meanwhile the British Labor party and the Trades Union Congress demanded a ban on patrol and training flights by nuclear bombers, British as well as American, and postponement of missile bases on British soil until the results of a summit conference have been ascertained.

Behind the smoke generated by the barrage of words exchanged in recent months by the U.S.S.R. and the West, one thing seems to be clear. The major issue at stake is not this or that specific aspect of territorial adjustments or military arrangements, but whether or not the *status quo* is to be preserved—in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

The two principal powers that emerged out of the shambles of World War II, the United States and Russia, have reached a stalemate in nuclear armaments. Henceforth any change that takes place in the international landscape may have the effect of a stone dislodged on an Alpine slope: it can precipitate an avalanche which might endanger one side or the other and, at worst, carry both down to destruction. It is therefore not surprising that both great powers are going through a protracted process of what seems like shadowboxing, but is in effect like a cautious mountain climber's testing

of terrain which may reveal terrifying unforeseen crevasses.

It is clear that this problem would not arise, or at least would be far less formidable, if what might be described as a state of peace existed between the West and the U.S.S.R. The problems we have encountered during the past decade in relations with our allies, such as the Suez crisis and the French bombing of a Tunisian village, show that the road of diplomacy is not always smooth even in friendly territory. In the case of the U.S.S.R., however, the element of friendship which can ease crises and salve wounded feelings is missing. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, at his March 4 press conference, commenting on Moscow's proposal for a foreign ministers' meeting to prepare a summit conference, said: "I don't know of any significant matter where the presently known positions give a reasonable likelihood of agreement." The great danger in the Soviet proposal, he went on, is that it might "substitute a fiction, a fiction that the cold war has come to an end, for the reality."

A Peace Conference?

If the situation we face is that of continued cold war, then in effect the summit conference might have to have the character of a peace conference; and the heads of government participating in it might have to deal with all, or at least the principal, issues left unresolved by World War II as well as by the Korean war of 1950 and the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 which were involved or have become involved with the cold war. Should the conditions created by these various conflicts remain unchanged? or should they be changed? And if they

are to be changed, what alterations should be made?—and which of these would have a chance of being accepted?

The answers to these questions depend on the vantage point from which you look at specific problems. In Europe the United States wants to change the *status quo* of two Germanys through their unification, with the hope that a united Germany would be a part of NATO. This hope is shared by the Adenauer government, but challenged by its opponents, the Social Democrats, who want a united Germany, but do not favor increase of its military role. Britain is not enthusiastic about German reunification, nor, so far as can be determined, is France. Russia, twice invaded by Germany in the lifetime of one generation, is adamantly opposed to the reunification of the two Germanys if the united nation is to become a part of NATO and militarized and armed with missiles with the aid of the United States. The Eastern European satellites, which have suffered from German depredations in the past, no matter how bitter they may be toward the Russians, have no desire to see a powerful, militarized German state reconstructed on their borders. This is particularly true of Poland, partitioned three times by Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary and a fourth time by Russia and Germany; and Czechoslovakia, which has not forgotten Munich.

In Europe, then, the United States favors an important change in the *status quo*—that of Germany—and so does the U.S.S.R., but on conditions unacceptable to Washington. The question is whether some of

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Israel's First Decade: 1948–1958

by Don Peretz

Dr. Peretz is research director of Regional Research Analysts, lecturer on the Middle East at Dropsie College, consultant on the Middle East to the American Jewish Committee, and author of *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*, to be published in April by the Middle East Institute. He has visited that area twice in the past year.

DURING its first decade of trial and error the new state of Israel has become a vigorous little nation, subsisting on a new art of intangible statecraft—faith, will and enthusiasm. Many of Israel's internal accomplishments during the first ten years of its existence are notable and will remain so historically, especially in view of the tremendous difficulties and incredible needs which have faced the nation. Traveling through the country today, one cannot but be impressed by its physical and material progress since 1948. Not only new towns and villages but whole new regions which until a few years ago existed in barren expanses are today peopled with the mélange of new immigrants, who have flooded into the area from Jewish communities the world over.

Along with the many accomplishments have come a myriad problems which few Israelis anticipated and none seem to have planned for. Among them are internal problems of absorbing the mass of disparate human beings from more than two-score of nations and welding them into a homogeneous national entity; the creation of an effective and competent governmental administration run on democratic lines; the settlement of bitter, often internecine, political and religious feuds; the struggle to create a viable economy which will free the nation from a perpetual circle of international loans and debts; and the new nation's all-pervasive problem of becoming accepted, not only in the international community at large, but more important, by the Arab nations which flank

Israel on the north, south and west.

In some respects the declaration of Israel's independence on May 14, 1948 was a mere formality, for a large part of the structure of government already existed in the quasi-government built up by world Zionism and the Jewish population of Palestine during the previous half-century. The three principal pillars of this quasi-government were the National Council, representing an assembly of Palestinian Jewry elected periodically during the era of the British mandate, the World Zionist Organization, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. The Histadrut, Israel's principal labor organization, also collaborated in the establishment and management of health, educational, welfare and settlement activities. Within the framework of this quasi-government there developed all the paraphernalia, customs and traditions of a modern political society. The pattern of Zionist institutions which evolved during the mandate era was the most visible imprint upon the new government of Israel, which, in addition, inherited much of the mandatory administration of Palestine and its by no means inconsiderable Jewish personnel.

A Mixed Population

Along with the structure, apparatus and experienced personnel of existing governmental institutions came many attributes which were not so conducive to the development of an effective democratic state. Not the least of these were over-suspicion and mistrust of centralized authority—a heritage from the underground days

when the Jewish community was practically at war with the British-run government of Palestine. Such reactions were exacerbated by the attitudes of many new immigrants. Some were victims of Nazi persecution, whose hatred of centralized authority was frequently turned against their own new government. Others, from Near and Middle Eastern Jewish communities, were culturally unprepared for the life of a dynamic Western state and for not only the extraordinary, but even the very ordinary, demands which Israel had to make on its citizens. Because the social organization of these communities was oriental, their concepts of loyalty frequently did not extend beyond their own family groupings. Most of the Near and Middle Easterners were imbued with cultural inhibitions toward government and its paraphernalia. Psychologically, they were fully prepared to resist such things as taxes, rationing and the like. More often than not they became a public responsibility rather than a responsible public.

In spite of these difficulties remarkable progress has been made since 1948 in creating a unified nation from the 700,000 Jews who lived in Palestine at the end of the mandate and the nearly 900,000 new immigrants. Indeed, a fundamental reason for Israel's creation has been the ingathering of Jews from the world over. This basic concept, buttressed by the implacable hostility of the surrounding Arab states, has forged a great *élan*, which from time to time becomes dampened by the drabness of routine tasks and aus-

terity, but nevertheless impresses most visitors.

Obviously the problems created by more than doubling the population of so small a state within a decade are legion. Perhaps the most fundamental have been those of economics. In an area and among a population with resources as limited as those of Israel, this unprecedented task would have been impossible had it not been for outside material assistance derived in large part from four main sources: American government aid in loans, grants, technical aid and gifts in kind, exceeding \$400 million; reparations which in 1952 West Germany contracted to pay over a period of 12 to 14 years to the government of Israel, totaling about \$715 million in partial restitution for the destruction of Jewish lives and property by the Nazis; philanthropic contributions raised from world Jewry, totaling more than \$600 million, of which over 80 percent has come from the American Jewish community; and the sale of Israeli government bonds, totaling more than \$300 million, sold mostly in the United States.

Economic Dependence

In addition to these main foreign sources of economic sustenance the Israeli government reaped a windfall from the property abandoned by the more than 700,000 Arabs who fled during the 'Palestinian' war. Of the 370 new Jewish settlements established in the first five years of Israel's existence, 350 were on abandoned Arab property. More than a quarter of the new immigrants have been settled in urban areas abandoned by Arabs, such as Jaffa, Acre, Lydda or Ramleh. The Arab refugees left some 388 towns and villages and nearly two-thirds of the country's cultivated agricultural lands, which were taken over by the Jews. A preliminary global estimate by the United Nations of abandoned Arab refugee property

came to well over \$200 million.

The problem of lessening the country's economic dependence on foreign sources by increasing productivity is not only of top priority, but perhaps the most complicated task of all. Had the rate of immigration not been so high, no doubt Israel could have maintained with ease the relatively high standard of living existing in the Jewish community during mandatory times. But since the state was founded on the premise that any Jew is free to immigrate, the ingathering has proved a costly burden, borne in large measure by world Jewry and the American and German governments. No matter how one defines absorption, a large part of the new population has not yet been absorbed economically or socially. Neither the economic nor social means have been available to digest such a large influx in so short a time. Only a few immigrants had skills on arrival which were of value to the nation. Quite a high proportion were nonproductive, and their integration has had to be subsidized.

Nevertheless there has been progress since 1948. Israel's unfavorable balance of trade which was then nine to one has been reduced to nearly three to one. Today Israelis are consuming 30 percent more of everything than ten years ago. The value of industrial output is six times greater, and the country can now produce 70 percent of its food needs. Land under cultivation has more than doubled and irrigated areas have quadrupled, producing a 300 percent increase in the real value of agricultural produce. Citrus production has been doubled since 1949, and citrus fruit continues to rank as the most valuable export, in some years supplying more than half of the nation's vital foreign-currency earnings.

Despite this progress many Israelis are worried about their country's subsidized economy and its continued

dependence on foreign aid. Many believe that the nation is living far beyond its means. They point out that although the standard of living of the Israeli worker is as high as that of the worker in Britain, his productivity is only half as high. (Productivity per worker, however, has grown by almost 50 percent since 1948.) An exceptionally high percentage of Israelis are employed in pursuits other than those which are basic to the economy—agriculture, industry and mining. Despite its economic difficulties a higher proportion of Israel's population works in services, including government and other national institutions like the Jewish Agency, than do the populations of any Western European nation. Were it not for the great subsidy from abroad, many Israeli critics say, their nation would be forced to pare down its nonproductive governmental apparatus and high quality, but not its medical, health, social welfare, and educational services supported by private gifts.

Economics vs. Social Welfare

The conflict between economics and social welfare is to a large extent inherited from the prestate era. Then the emphasis of the Zionist institutions, which now form the principal pillars of the state, was less on the economic productivity of labor and the creation of a viable economy than on social and egalitarian ideals. This outlook continues to pervade the highest circles of the Israeli government and often influences national planning more than all other factors. Such thinking views Israel more as an abstract ideal than as a worldly entity subject to the economic, political and social pressures of the mid-20th century. It places more emphasis on faith and other such intangibles than on the hard and cold realities of budget planning, import-export ratios and the like. Yet it is this

intangible statecraft which is no doubt largely responsible for the many accomplishments of Israel's first decade.

In line with the emphasis on social and egalitarian ideals inherited by the state of Israel was a fundamentally democratic political structure, complete with representative parliamentary institutions and a gamut of parties ranging the political spectrum from right to extreme left. Within the 120-member Knesset, or parliament, more than a dozen political parties are represented. This necessitates the establishment of coalition governments. Mapai, the moderate labor party led by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, has dominated the government since its establishment because of the pervasive influence it has obtained through the powerful Histadrut labor organization. Although the influence of Mapai exceeds by far that of any other political organization, its failure to obtain a majority has forced it to make compromises with other parties. That which has created the greatest criticism is its agreement with the orthodox religious parties not to interfere in the rabbinical domination of matters such as personal status questions and prohibitions on pig raising, importation of nonkosher meat and Sabbath traffic of intercity transport.

A Democratic Society

The variety of parties has developed an intensely partisan political environment in which loyalty to party often transcends even national considerations. But in few other countries in the world is there such a climate of freedom for all to express themselves. The press, which is largely party-oriented, is free in its criticism of the government on issues ranging from economic policy to the treatment of the Arab minority and foreign affairs. Perhaps the most vocal criticism comes from the small

Communist party and press which do not hesitate to attack the government on nearly every issue and at times even question the validity of Israel's very existence.

Israel and the Arabs

Although Israel is basically a democratic society, the government's policy, or some say lack of policy, toward the Arab minority is a source of great dissatisfaction, not only among the country's Arabs, who complain of second-class citizenship, but among many liberal Jews. Recently an organization called the Jewish-Arab Association for Peace and Equality, representing a cross section of several political parties, the Arab community and a number of leading intellectuals, was formed to induce the government to remove such remaining restraints on the minority as the requirement that they have military passes to travel in many sections of the country and the imposition of martial law on several areas in which Arabs live. The association has also committed itself to work for the continued improvement of Arab village conditions and the complete attainment of equality, in fact as well as in theory, for the minority.

Overshadowing all aspects of Israeli life are the nation's relations with its Arab neighbors. The continued state of war is a great drain on the national economy, absorbs a large amount of manpower, and keeps up a continued state of nervous tension. It affects the attitude of Israelis toward their Arab minority and the attitude of the great powers and the UN toward Israel.

Relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors are dominated by mutual fear—Israeli fear generated by the continuous stream of Arab threats to cut the Jewish state down to size and Arab fear of Israeli expansionism. Arab fears are based on Israel's policy of unlimited Jewish

immigration. Where, ask the Arabs, will the additional 2 million Jews whom Prime Minister Ben Gurion would like to bring into the country within the next few years be settled? The primary difficulty would not be a land shortage. Israel still has not absorbed many areas within its present borders, and one of its chief problems is inducing new immigrants to settle in rural regions.

The greatest obstacle to a sudden increase of population is the nation's limited water resources. Utilizing water resources now known to be available with present methods of irrigation, soil and water usage, the country is now close to its absorptive capacity. Even with the use of Jordan River waters as proposed in 1953 by the Eric Johnston plan for regional development of the Jordan valley there would be just barely enough water to sustain an Israeli population of not much more than 2 million. According to Johnston's estimates there is just not enough Jordan water to supply the full needs of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Only by pre-empting part of its neighbor's share could either state fulfill its national needs.

Since the 1956 Sinai "victory" over Egypt, many Israelis are beginning to take a second look at the long-term implications of the campaign. They realize that population limitations restrict Israel's military potential relative to that of the rapidly growing combined strength of its neighbors. With the recent steps taken toward Arab unity Israel, in its present form, looms as an obstacle to the ultimate realization of Arab nationalist aspirations. This is especially so since the Sinai campaign in which, Arab leaders say, Israel showed its true colors as a bridgehead of "Western imperialism."

Groups such as the previously mentioned Jewish-Arab Association for Peace and Equality and the small

Itud movement, composed mostly of intellectuals, are becoming increasingly concerned about problems like the Arab refugees and the way in which the refugees affect the nation's relations with its neighbors and its future existence. They differ with Ben Gurion's primary emphasis on the need for increased military strength and reliance on Western alliances. In their opinion greater importance should be placed on some accommodation with the Arab states based on equitable compromise and solution of the conflicts which constantly create friction along the frontiers. Many believe that only an overall settlement between the Soviet Union and the United States on global issues, including a resolution of Middle East problems, would bring peace to the area. The recent unions of Syria and Egypt and Jordan and Iraq point up the need for an urgent reappraisal of Israel's position in the Middle East and a new outlook on its relationships with its neighbors.

READING SUGGESTIONS: David Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1954); Marver Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957); Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* (Washington, D.C., Middle East Institute, 1958).

Spotlight

(Continued from page 108)

these conditions, embodied in the Rapacki plan for nonnuclearization of Central Europe, will be more pal-

atable in London and Paris, Warsaw and Prague, than they are here. The U.S.S.R., for its part, firmly bars any discussion of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, which the United States, aware since the Hungarian revolt that liberation is not a practicable objective, wants to discuss. Meanwhile, some of the best-informed European observers believe that the Rapacki plan, either in its present form or with modifications, offers the best prospect for eventual loosening of Moscow's hold on Poland, Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries.

In Asia the U.S.S.R. favors an important change in *status quo*—the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, and thereby an end to Taiwan's claim that it represents mainland China. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. want to change the *status quo* in Korea, but in diametrically opposite ways—the Americans by uniting North Korea with South Korea through free elections, the Russians by uniting the two parts of Korea under Communist rule.

In Africa and the Middle East Moscow acts as the champion of all possible changes, provided they represent the ouster of the Western colonial powers. The United States, torn between its support of France, a NATO ally, and its traditional sympathy for anticolonial movements,

takes an ambivalent position on the explosive situation in Algeria, which is having incalculable repercussions in North Africa and the Middle East. And, finally, the U.S.S.R. demands, and the United States rejects, a change in the *status quo* of American bases around the periphery of the Soviet bloc; while the United States desires, and the U.S.S.R. shows little interest in, an immediate arrangement about control of outer space.

Thus each side looks on the existing state of affairs primarily from the point of view of national or, at most, regional alliance interests and, to a lesser extent, of ideological considerations. The question arises whether today, any more than in past history, any great power can hope indefinitely to preserve the *status quo*. If these interests are to be reconciled, even in a modest way, not only between the Big Four which attended the 1953 Geneva summit conference, but also between them and the uncommitted non-Western peoples, then a breakthrough may be needed which has not yet been contemplated: a breakthrough on procedures, which would permit discussion of the world's *status quo* on an international basis, by holding the much-discussed conference at the headquarters of the United Nations, as proposed by UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld.

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